Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy [Arthur Ripstein] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. In this masterful work, both an. Arthur Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, Harvard UP, , pp., $ (hbk), ISBN Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom is a major accomplishment; there is something to be learned from virtually every page. Ripstein’s goal is to reconstruct and.

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Force and Freedom

Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Basic to this concept of freedom is being “your own master” sui jurisin contrast to being like a slave or serf subordinated to the will of another. This website uses cookies to improve user experience.

It also does not provide, in my view, a satisfactory interpretation of certain parts frerdom it, such as punishment and international right.

Nevertheless Ripstein does ably expound Kant’s theory freefom right in the way it ought to be expounded, and he gives thoughtful discussion of a wide range of issues from the authentically Kantian perspective on right and politics.

Crime, Freedom and Civic Bonds: The essays offer readings and elucidations of Ripstein’s thought, dispute some of his claims and extend some of his themes within broader philosophical contexts, thus developing the significance of Ripstein’s ideas for contemporary legal and political philosophy. Yankah – feredom Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 2: As Ripstein points out, this concept of freedom was not new with Kant.

Kant may redescribe many cases in which his position is thought indefensible. Coercion and the Grounds of Legal Obligation: Ownership, as Ripstein emphasizes, has a “mine or yours” structure — involving the exclusion of others rilstein the use of the thing pp. Ripstein also argues that consent cannot be understood as a merely unilateral act, but always has the structure of an offer and an acceptance, requiring both parties to join their wills pp.

The Innate Right of Humanity.

Chapter 10 takes up the state’s right to punish crime, and Ripstein’s position broadly follows that of Sharon Byrd, who emphasizes the state’s right coercively to prevent wrong, and sees Kant’s well-known retributivism as conditioned by this aim. So our conversation, which consisted mainly of youth listening to the fresdom wisdom of age, centered on the current state of Kant scholarship.

Ripstein offers an interpretation similar to Jan Joerden and Alyssa Bernstein: The innate right to freedom over your own body must be “extended” to things outside you. Ripstein also argues that on a Kantian account, “if illness and medical expenses regularly lead citizens to fall into conditions of dependency, a state can act proactively to provide publicly funded universal health care” p. Revolution and freedpm Right of Human Beings as Such.


On the Kantian account, private rights not only become determinate and enforceable only in the context of a state governed by a general will, but also forcs is possible truly to acquire something only in a civil condition. That Hobbes seems largely to have won out in the way philosophers think about freedom, ripetein attested by the fact that on issue after issue, Ripstein must begin by arguing that from the Kantian standpoint, all the now familiar approaches ask the wrong questions, so that much of this book anf a Kantian reformulation of the terms in which familiar issues of law and politics should be discussed.

Force and Freedom

Readings in the Philosophy of Law. Chapter 7’s treatment of international right seems hard to reconcile with what Kant defends in all his main writings on the subject. Ripstein argues, however, that as a “postulate”, right “extends” the principle of morality “because as a rational being you could not will a universal law under which you could never set a purpose for yourself, or one under which you could only do so with the leave of another” p.

Lea Ypi – – European Journal of Philosophy 22 2: External Freedom in Kant’s Rechtslehre: Find it on Scholar.

Harvard University Press How can the doctrine of right Rechtif it proceeds independently of the doctrine of virtue or ethics Tugend, Ethikalso constitute a part — indeed, the first part — of Kant’s comprehensive theory of morals Sitten? The fact that Kant’s theory of right proceeds solely from the concept of right and the innate right to freedom, and not from any moral principle, does not entirely settle the vexed question of the relation between Kant’s “supreme principle of right” MS 6: The innate right to freedom concerns pursuit of your ends based on the means available through your own body.

Ripstein argues for the Kantian thesis that rightfully sharing purposes with others is not possible merely through adding one person’s volition to another’s, but requires a “joining of wills” through mutual acts, each of which takes the other’s volitional act as an object p. There is no space here to say why I regard this interpretation of Kant, though sympathetic and philosophically plausible, to be textually indefensible. Chapter 1 is a general overview of Kant’s theory of law and justice.

A Regime of Equal Private Freedom?

Mills – – Res Philosophica 95 1: Neither Justice nor Charity? George Pavlakos – – Jurisprudence 1 2: In this masterful work, both an illumination of Kant’s thought and an important contribution to contemporary legal and political theory, Arthur Riipstein gives a comprehensive yet accessible account of Kant’s political philosophy.


Ripstein’s Kantian account emphasizes that the state, in order to make good the defects of a pre-political condition in these respects must be empowered to act in the name of all its members. Ripstein argues, for instance, that when the poor are supported through any form of charity, however benevolently intended, this puts them in essentially the same position they would be in if they were slaves.

Until now, however, I fredom never found the book Fresdom thought so badly needed to be written. The state may act only in ways fipstein with each citizen’s innate right to freedom, but its duty to create and maintain a rightful condition involves powers that are “capacious and open-ended” and “does not preclude most of the familiar activities of modern states” p.


Realism in Normative Political Theory. In Chapter 9, Ripstein argues at length that the Kantian state has wide powers and responsibilities when it comes to economic control and redistribution. Since then I have read many good books on Kant’s legal and political philosophy, many by people I know and respect one of them even based on a doctoral dissertation I supervised.

Thus the principle of right “provides a license to consider things in space and time under laws of freedom” p.

Kant’s theory divides right into two basic spheres: Ripstein defends such a treatment of the case of Nazi Germany in some empirical detail, making a very persuasive case for this Kantian approach to it. This book is also available in other formats: But this book finally appears to be it. Gadamer told me I should write such a book — a recommendation I found flattering, but I also immediately and silently dismissed, partly because my principal interest in Kant was precisely in his ethics, but chiefly because I thought it could be done properly only by someone who had much more knowledge of law than I had, or ever intended to acquire.

As Skinner has argued in his recent book, Hobbes and Republican Libertyit was opposed by Hobbes. Choice, Ripstein points out, for Kant as for Aristotle, is distinguished from mere wish by the fact that you take yourself to have the means available to pursue your end p.